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Respondent Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center-Nampa,

by and through
afﬁrm the

its

Alphonsus”),

counsel of record, hereby submits this Respondent’s Brief requesting the Court

District Court’s dismissal

I.

Plaintiffs,

Inc. (“Saint

both uninsured

Emergency Department

in

0f this action.

INTRODUCTION

at the time,

sought emergency medical care

at Saint

Alphonsus’s

June 2015. Before leaving the hospital, both executed Saint

Alphonsus’s Consent t0 Medical Care and Patient Services Agreement (“Agreement”), agreeing
t0

pay

“all

charges incurred” for their emergency care at Saint Alphonsus.

Plaintiffs

were each billed for “all charges incurred”

Plaintiffs

ﬁled

this lawsuit

for the care they each received. Subsequently,

arguing that the “all charges incurred” language in the Agreement

an open price term that did not allow Saint Alphonsus t0
p.

7,

11

1.)

Based 0n

Per the Agreement,

bill its

that position, Plaintiffs argue Saint

undetermined “reasonable value” 0f the services
42) and that the Agreement

is

standard charges. (See R. Vol.

Alphonsus

may

only

it is

unconscionable.

bill

for

(Id.) Plaintiffs

sought

its

standard

charges and prohibiting Saint Alphonsus from attempting to collect 0n services billed at
(Id. at

1]

an

W 40-

I,

declaratory relief prohibiting Saint Alphonsus from billing uninsured patients at

standard charges.

I,

p. 17,

Plaintiffs received (See R. V01.

unenforceable because

left

its

44).

In response to the Complaint, Saint Alphonsus ﬁled a

Motion to Dismiss and provided the

Court With the at-issue Consent to Medical Care and Patient Services Agreement (“Agreement”).

Given this addition 0fthe
t0

Dismiss

than

is

t0 a

Motion

at—issue

for

Agreement to the record, the District Court converted the Motion

Summary Judgment

(“Motion”). After Plaintiffs were given more time

provided for in Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 56 t0 respond to the Motion, and after a

hearing 0n such Motion, the Court granted the Motion and dismissed Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
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The

District Court’s decision t0 grant

summary judgment

t0 Saint

Alphonsus should be afﬁrmed for

the following reasons.
First, Plaintiffs

the

Motion

as a

waived any argument 0n appeal

Motion

the District Court.

for

that the District

Summary Judgment because

In addition, Plaintiffs also

Court incorrectly treated

argument to

Plaintiffs failed to raise that

waived any argument

that the record did not

have

sufﬁcient facts for the District Court t0 rule 0n the Motion because Plaintiffs chose not t0 seek
additional time per Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(d) to develop and submit additional
facts in

response t0 the Motion and, instead, chose to respond t0 the Motion and t0 not submit

additional facts in support 0f their opposition for the Court t0 consider before ruling

Even

if the District

Judgment

is

0n the Motion.

Court’s decision t0 treat the Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for

considered, the District Court did not err because

required under I.R.C.P. 12(d) t0 convert the Motion

When

it

it

Summary

correctly recognized that

it

was

considered evidence outside the

pleadings and gave Plaintiffs more than adequate time to respond to the Motion.

Second, the District Court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing because there

was n0

likelihood that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries

that Plaintiffs speciﬁcally advised the District

would be redressed by a favorable

Court that they were

the reasonable value of the services rendered or the
billed.

Instead, Plaintiffs did not offer

and speciﬁcally stated

that they

Alphonsus’ services in

n_0t

amount Plaintiffs

any evidence

ruling given

seeking a determination 0f

allege they should

have been

that the hospital’s charges are unreasonable

were not seeking a determination of the reasonable value 0f Saint

this case.

Third, the District Court correctly concluded the “actual relief” requirement ofjusticiability

was not met because
controversy due

the relief Plaintiffs requested

t0, again, Plaintiffs’

for the services they

were provided.
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would not conclusively resolve

the alleged

decision not t0 pursue a determination of the reasonable value

Fourth, as noted

by the

District Court, Plaintiffs’ theories in this case

and rejected by courts throughout the country because
Violation 0f

any statutes— are simply arguing

that

it is

— d0 not and cannot

Plaintiffs

allege a

unfair to charge uninsured patients Saint

Alphonsus’s standard charges and that courts should
Plaintiffs

have been considered

binding agreement between

set aside a

set the “reasonable values” for hospital services.

and Saint Alphonsus and instead

In

addition t0 unjustiﬁably requesting this Court ignore the unambiguous language 0f the parties’

Agreement,

Plaintiffs seek relief

from the judicial branch

for issues that

have already been

addressed by the legislative branch. The District Court correctly rejected Plaintiffs’ theories and

decided that Plaintiffs’ declaratory action claim against Saint Alphonsus should be dismissed.
Next, the District Court also correctly concluded that the undisputed facts established, as a
matter 0f law, that the term “charges” was sufﬁciently clear not t0 be an “open price” term.
Finally, the District

Court correctly rejected

Plaintiffs’

claim that the Agreements were

unconscionable because there was no evidence of high-pressure

was n0 evidence

other threats t0 sign the Agreements and there
obligation provision

was

t0 Saint

this

Alphonsus and dismissing

The unveriﬁed Complaint

13,

11

(Id)

23.)

While

Complaint.

Complaint

alleges that

emergency treatment

at Saint

Plaintiffs’

Summary

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs’ Allegations in the

Plaintiffs received

Agreement’s ﬁnancial

Court should uphold the District Court’s decision granting

II.

A.

that the

unfairly one-sided.

For those reasons,

Judgment

tactics, coercion, oppression, or

at

0n “June

16,

2015 and again 0n June 22, 2015,

Defendant’s emergency

facilities.”

(R. V01.

I,

p. 12-

Alphonsus, Plaintiffs “were presented with and signed” the Agreement.

Plaintiffs allege this “Contract contains a ﬁnancial responsibility provision, providing a

promise

t0

pay for services provided[.]”
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(R. V01.

I,

p. 10,

11

12.) Plaintiffs allege they

were

directly

and services they received

billed for the treatment
for Plaintiff Valencia

100% 0f

and $3,644.85 for

Plaintiff

Defendants’ Chargemaster rates.”

“Chargemaster”

t0 refer t0 Saint

rate schedule for the services

at Saint

Williams

(R. V01.

I,

.

.

p.

.

in the

amounts 0f “$4,259.60

and such amounts were based 0n

13,

ﬂ 25.)

and goods Saint Alphonsus provides
Plaintiffs

use the term

Plaintiffs

Alphonsus’s “charge description master,” that

With nothing more than a conclusory statement,

1.)

Alphonsus

is,

the standard

t0 patients. (R. Vol.

I,

p. 7,

11

claim they “reasonably expected

they would not be billed for more than the reasonable value 0f the treatment/services.” (See R.
V01.

I,

p. 13,

1]

24.).

Plaintiffs also allege the “vast majority

whom

are

presented with Defendant’s

0f Defendant’s emergency care patients,

standard

Contract

for

governmental healthcare plans, private commercial insurance plans, 0r charity programs.”
V01.

p.

I,

11,

11

Alphonsus’s Chargemaster rates.”
“artiﬁcially inﬂated

its

only group 0f patients
V01.

I,

p. 12,

11

20.)

who

are actually billed

Plaintiffs then

hospital’s ‘gross charges,

bill

The Complaint

Chargemaster rates for

unconscionable practice.”

for in the

(Id.)

(Id.)

3”

g0 0n

its

own

further alleges that Saint

Alphonsus has

ends,” and that self—pay patients are “the

0n the basis 0f these

t0 allege that billing

artiﬁcially inﬂated rates.” (R.

pursuant t0 the Agreement “is an

After acknowledging the hospital’s “Chargemaster” contains “the

(R. Vol.

I,

p. 10,

11

14) the very

same “charges”

Plaintiff agreed t0

Agreement, Plaintiff then paradoxically alleges that Saint Alphonsus

self—pay patients for

(R.

“groups 0f ‘covered’ patients” d0 not pay Saint

Plaintiffs allege these

16.)

0f

covered by

are

signature,

all

no more than the reasonable value 0f its

is

pay

only “entitled t0

services.” (R. V01.

I,

p. 12,

11

2 1 .)

Notably, Plaintiffs speciﬁcally stated in their Complaint that they “are not asking the Court to

determine the reasonable value of any services rendered t0 Plaintiffs 0r other patients.” (R. V01.
I,

p. 14,

1]

28 (emphasis added).)
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Plaintiffs allege that

“Medicare ﬁlings

list

indicating that Defendant’s Chargemaster rates
for providing treatment/services.” (R. V01.
at

anywhere near Chargemaster

unconscionable 0n

face.”

its

rates

(Id.)

I,

Hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio

were over three times

p. 11,

would be
Plaintiffs

1]

room

services, but instead

.

as 30.48 14%,

ofﬁcially reported costs

contend that “billing

Plaintiffs further

19.)

.

beyond any reasonable proﬁt margin and

far

d0 not allege any correlation between Saint

Alphonsus’s reported hospital-Wide cost-to-charge
providing emergency

its

.

ratio,

and the alleged “reasonable value” 0f

summarily conclude

are far in excess 0f the reasonable value 0f services provided.”

that the

(R. V01.

“Chargemaster rates

I,

p. 12,

21.)

1]

And

although Plaintiffs repeatedly allege that Saint Alphonsus

is

entitled t0 charge self—pay patients

more than

I,

p. 7-19), again, Plaintiffs

the “reasonable value” 0f services (see R. V01.

stated in their

.

.

.

t0 Plaintiffs 0r other patients.”

t0 Plaintiffs

because they, “through
rates

speciﬁcally

Complaint that they “are not asking the Court t0 determine the reasonable value 0f

any services rendered
According

n0

(R. V01.

I,

p. 14,

11

28 (emphasis added).)

however, the “reasonable value” 0f Saint Alphonsus’s services
this action,

is critical

seek a resolution as to whether they are liable for Chargemaster

0r for the reasonable value 0f Defendant’s services received.” (Id.)

The Complaint pleads n0

facts suggesting the

Agreement is

illegal

nor any facts that would

give rise to a duty 0n the part 0f Saint Alphonsus t0 charge them any rates other than the hospital’s

standard charges set forth in

its

Chargemaster, which they agreed to pay by signing the Agreement.

Ultimately, Plaintiffs failed to allege facts which
the parties that

was appropriate

would establish a justiciable controversy between

for adjudication

and for which

Plaintiffs

were

entitled t0

declaratory relief.

B.

The At—Issue Agreement and
Because

the Financial Policv Within That Agreement

Plaintiffs did not provide the District

the basis for their Complaint and cited
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by

Plaintiffs

Court With a copy of the Agreement that

is

throughout their Complaint, Saint Alphonsus

attached the Agreement as Exhibit

Motion. (R. V01.
Br. at 5 fn.4.)

I,

A t0 Ms.

p. 43-49.) Plaintiffs

Duke’s declaration submitted concurrently with the

d0 not dispute the authenticity 0f the Agreement. (See Op.

The Agreement contains a “Financial Policy” provision that is the basis

for Plaintiffs’

Complaint. This provision states in part:

I agree t0 abide by the ﬁnancial policies relating t0 my payment obligations for
medical care received by Patient as such policies are adopted from time to time by
Saint Alphonsus and acknowledge that a copy ofsuch policies is available in the
registration area and upon request. I further understand and agree that I am
ﬁnancially responsibleforpayment ofall charges incurred which are notpaid by
any Third—Parly Payors (With such charges payable upon discharge unless other
arrangements have been made in advance), including, any and all products
provided 0r services rendered to Patient which are not eligible for payment by any
Third-Party Payors (e.g., services rendered by health care providers who d0 not
participate with Patient’s insurance plan.)
(R. V01.

I,

p.

47 (emphases added).)

Procedural Posture

C.

Plaintiffs

ﬁled their Complaint 0n June 12, 2017. (R. V01.

I,

p. 6.)

Pursuant t0 Idaho Rule

0f Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Saint Alphonsus moved t0 dismiss the Complaint on December

2017 on the grounds
V01.

I,

p. 20-49.)

Agreement both

that Plaintiffs failed t0 state a cause

As noted

15,

of action against Saint Alphonsus. (R.

above, Saint Alphonsus submitted a true and correct copy 0f the

Plaintiffs signed

when

they were treated

at Saint

Alphonsus. (R. V01.

I,

p.

43-

49.) Plaintiffs obj ected to the

Motion 0n January 24, 2018, and Saint Alphonsus submitted a reply

memorandum

its

in support

Plaintiffs did not

move

0f

to strike

Motion on February

16, 2018.

(R. V01.

I,

p.

50-76; 77-88.)

Ms. Duke’s declaration 0r otherwise dispute 0r challenge the

authenticity or accuracy 0f the Agreement. (See also Op. Br. at 5 fn.4 (“The authenticity 0f the

signed Contract

is

not in dispute.”).) The District Court held a hearing 0n the Motion 0n

2018 and issued a Decision and Order 0n April 30, 201 8

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF -

6

(“First Order”).

(R. V01.

I,

p.

March

96-104.)

8,

In
it

t0 a

its

Court declined to rule on the Motion and instead converted

First Order, the District

Motion

for

Summary Judgment.

(R. V01.

Rule 0f Civil Procedure 12(d), which provides

I,

p. 102.)

that “[i]f,

The

summary judgment under Rule

56.”

by

(R. Vol.

the court, the motion

I,

I,

p. 99.)

Supreme Court case Syringa Networks,

The District Court

LLC v.

further cited

all

“is

must be

the material that

is

and relied on the Idaho

Department ofAdministration, 159 Idaho 813, 367

P.3d 208 (2016), for the proposition that converting the Motion to a Motion for

Judgment

12(0),

Rule 12(d) further

p. 99.)

provides that “[a]ll parties must be given reasonable opportunity to present
pertinent t0 the motion.” (R. V01.

upon Idaho

0n a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 0r

matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded
treated as one for

District Court relied

mandatory rather than discretionary, requiring

that ‘the

motion

shall

Summary

be treated as

’

one for summary judgment[] when matters outside the pleadings are presented and considered by
the court.” (R. V01.

was

I,

p. 101.)

The

District

Court determined that the most “prudent” approach

to provide notice to Plaintiffs that the court intended t0 consider the

Plaintiffs

Agreement and provide

With additional time t0 respond t0 What was not originally styled a Motion for

Judgment. (R. V01.

I,

p.

102-103.)

As

Summary

such, the District Court allowed Plaintiffs 30 days to submit

additional responsive brieﬁng and materials relevant t0 the court’s consideration 0f the Motion.
(R. V01.

I,

p.

103.)

The

District

Court also allowed Saint Alphonsus t0 respond t0

additional brieﬁng materials prior to ruling. (R. V01.

would submit

their supplemental materials

by June

I,

p.

103 .) The parties stipulated that Plaintiffs

21, 2018, thereby giving Plaintiffs even

time to respond than the District Court had originally allowed. (See Aug.

Court granted the extension. (See Aug.

On June 21,

Plaintiff’s

p. 1-3.)

The

more

District

p. 4-6.)

2018, Plaintiffs ﬁled a supplemental brief opposing the Motion. (R. Vol.

I,

p.

105-135.) Plaintiffs did not seek addition time for discovery per Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure
56(d) and chose not t0 offer any evidence With their supplemental brief. Saint Alphonsus ﬁled
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its

sur—reply to the

Motion on July 24, 2018.

(R. V01.

I,

p.

held a second hearing 0n October 11, 2018, and issued

Order”) 0n December 14, 2018, whereby
to

Whether the Complaint

Alphonsus was

The

p. 182.)

Judgment

in favor

I,

p.

claim for declaratory relief and, therefore, Saint

0f Saint Alphonsus 0n January

0n appeal

0f Appeal, Plaintiffs identiﬁed the issues for appeal

as,

additional issues presented

Rule 12(d) provides that

“if,

t0 Dismiss t0 a

by

“Whether the

District

-18 1 .)

2019. (R. Vol.

I,

brief. In their

Notice

Court erred in ruling

Saint Alphonsus does not raise any

Motion for Summarv Judgment

the court, the motion

summary judgment under Rule

56.” I.R.C.P. 12(d).

motion for summary judgment,

“all parties

When a Rule

12(0), matters outside the

must be treated

12(b)(6) motion

is

must be given a reasonable opportunity

pertinent t0 the motion.” Id.

summary judgment is

LLC v.

opening

0n a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 0r

pleadings are presented to and not excluded

Syringa Networks,

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Conversion 0f a Motion

dismiss t0 a motion for

p. 15

0n appeal.
IV.

B.

in their

by granting Defendants’ Motion t0 Dismiss.”

is

8,

I,

184-187.)

Plaintiffs failed t0 list the issues presented

the material that

fact existed as

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

III.

A.

second Decision and Order (“Second

0f the Complaint as a matter 0f law. (R. V01.

This appeal followed. (R. V01.

against Plaintiffs

its

found that n0 genuine issue of material

set forth a Viable

entitled t0 a dismissal

District Court entered

it

136-149.) Thereafter, the District Court

as

one for

treated as a

t0 present all

A district court’s decision t0 convert a motion t0

a conclusion of law and

is

subj ect t0 de

novo review.

Idaho Dep’t 0fAdmin., 159 Idaho 813, 367 P.3d 208, 218 (2016).

Motion for Summarv Judgment Standard Under Rule 56
This Court reviews dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), and grants of summary judgment under
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Rule 56 de novo. Paslay

v.

A&B Irrigation Dist.,

summary judgment in actions

This Court reviews motions for

in other civil suits.” Kepler—Fleenor

(2012) (citing Schneider

v.

162 Idaho 866, 868, 406 P.3d 878, 880 (2017).

v.

Fremont

City,

for declaratory relief “as they

would

152 Idaho 207, 210, 268 P.3d 1159, 1162

Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 770-77 1, 122 P.3d 1232, 1235-36 (2006)

(applying I.R.C.P. 56(0) in a declaratory relief action)). Pursuant t0 Rule 56(a), “the court must
grant

fact

summary judgment

and the movant

that a fact cannot

is

if the

movant shows

entitled t0

be 0r

is

judgment

that there is

no genuine dispute

as a matter 0f law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a).

as to

any material

“A party asserting

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by” either citing t0

particular parts of materials in the record, such as pleadings, depositions, admissions, declarations,

and afﬁdavits, 0r by “showing

that the materials cited

d0 not establish the absence or presence of

a genuine dispute, 0r that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence t0 support the fact.”
“If a party fails t0 properly support an assertion 0f fact 0r fails t0 properly

I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1).

address another party's assertion of fact as required
fact undisputed for

When

by Rule

56(0), the court

may

consider the

purposes 0f the motion.” I.R.C.P. 56(6).

the party

moving

production 0r proof at

for

summary judgment

will not carry the burden 0f

‘

trial,

the genuine issue 0f material fact’

burden may be met

by establishing the absence 0f evidence 0n an element that the nonmoving party
will be required t0 prove at trial. Once such an absence of evidence has been
established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to establish,
through further depositions, discovery responses 0r afﬁdavits, that there
a genuine issue for

trial,

is

indeed

0r t0 offer a valid justiﬁcation for the failure to do s0 under

I.R.C.P. 56(f).

Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 31 1, 882 P.2d 475, 478
Sanders

v.

Kuna

(Ct.

App. 1994) (emphases added)

(citing

Joint School District, 125 Idaho 872, 876 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1994)).

“absence 0f evidence

The

may be established either by an afﬁrmative showing with the moving party’s
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own

evidence or by a review of

proof of an element

Judgment Doctrine:

all

lacking.”

is

Id. at

fn.

(citing

1

and the contention

that such

Summary

Martin B. Louis, Federal

(Ct.

App. 2014)

(citing Dunnick With approval

burden [0f a moving party 0n a motion for summary judgment]

establishing the absence of evidence

prove

311,

party's evidence

A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L.J. 745, 750 (1974)); see also McHugh

156 Idaho 299, 303, 324 P.3d 998, 1002
that “[t]he

nonmoving

the

on an element

that the

nonmoving party

v.

Reid,

and holding

may be met by

Will be required to

at trial.”).

Thus, While the movant has the burden ofproving the absence 0f a genuine issue ofmaterial
fact, “[i]f the

shifts t0 the

moving party has demonstrated the absence of a question 0f material

nonmoving party to demonstrate an

judgment.” Johnson

Wattenbarger

v.

v.

fact,

the burden

issue of material fact that will preclude

summary

Wal—Mart Stores, Ina, 164 Idaho 53, 423 P.3d 1005, 1008 (2018) (quoting

A.G. Edwards

& Sons, Ina,

150 Idaho 308, 317, 246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010)). The

nonmoving party must then “present evidence
which demonstrates a question 0f material

contradicting that submitted

fact.” Id. (citing

Kiebert

v.

by

the movant, and

Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228,

159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007)). “T0 withstand a motion for summary judgment, the [nonmoving
party’s] case

evidence

is

must be anchored

in

something more solid than speculation; a mere

410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990) (quoting

1279

(Ct.

RG.

not enough t0 create a genuine issue.”

Edwards

v.

Nelson, A.I.A.

v.

contradict the assertions 0f the
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moving

0f

Steer, 118 Idaho 409,

Conchemco, Ina, 111 Idaho 851, 727 P.2d

App. 1986)). “The party opposing the motion may not merely

contained in the pleadings; rather, evidence by

scintilla

rest

0n the

allegations

way of afﬁdavit or deposition must be produced t0

party.”

Ambrose By

&

Through Ambrose

v.

Buhl Joint

Sch. Dist. N0. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct.

App. 1994) (quoting Podolan

v.

Idaho LegalAid Services, Ina, 123 Idaho 937, 941—42, 854 P.2d 280, 284—85 (Ct .App. 1993)).
Contrary t0 Plaintiffs’ contention in their Opening Brief, the District Court did not unfairly
place the burden on Plaintiffs t0 prove their case. Rather, as discussed
Plaintiffs’ failure t0 support

conclusion.

not defeat

As

any elements 0f their case

the District Court noted in

its

more

fully herein,

t0

was

that led to the District Court’s inevitable

Second Order: “The existence 0f disputed

summary judgment When the plaintiff fails

it

make

facts will

a showing sufﬁcient t0 establish the

existence 0f an element essential t0 his case, and 0n Which he will bear the burden 0f proof at

V01.

trial.” (R.

I,

p.

157 (Citing Garzee

v.

Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct.

App. 1992).) As explained by the Court 0f Appeals in Ambrose:

Summary judgment

dismissing a claim

is

appropriate

When

the plaintiff fails t0

submit evidence t0 establish an essential element 0fthe claim. Badell

Beeks, 115

v.

Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 774,
828 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct.App.1992). “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine
issue 0f material fact,’ since a complete failure 0f proof concerning an essential

element 0f the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders

all

other facts

immaterial.” Id.

126 Idaho

at

584 (quoting Podolan, 123 Idaho

factually unsupported claims prior t0 trial.”

at

941—42). “This rule

Venters

v.

facilitates the dismissal

0f

Sorrento Delaware, Ina, 141 Idaho 245,

250, 108 P.3d 392, 397 (2005). Appellate courts review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) and grants

of summary judgment under Rule 56 de nova. Paslay

406 P.3d

v.

A&B Irrigation Dist,

162 Idaho

at

868,

at 880.

While a responding party may seek a continuance of a dispositive motion proceeding
collect

and present additional evidence,
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to

do

so, the party

t0

seeking such relief must comply with

Rule 56(d) which requires that

it

afﬁrmatively demonstrate

motion Will enable him, by discovery or other means,
0f a genuine issue 0f
104,

fact.”

Boise Mode,

“how postponement 0f a ruling on

to rebut the

the

movant’s showing 0f the absence

LLC v. Donahoe Pace &

Partners Ltd, 154 Idaho 99,

294 P.3d 1111, 1116 (2013) (discussing former I.R.C.P. 56(d);

internal citations omitted).

Thus, the party seeking a continuance has the burden 0f showing “what further discovery would
reveal that

it

is

essential to justify their opposition,

would preclude summary judgment.”

deny a request
trial court.

C.

Motion

294 P.3d

t0 Dismiss,

at

clear

What information is sought and how

Id. (internal citations omitted).

for a continuance pursuant t0

Id. at 103,

making

Rule 56(d)

lies

The decision

to grant 0r

wholly within the discretion 0f the

1115. Plaintiffs chose not t0 seek Rule 56(d)

relief.

Rule 12(b)(6)

In the event this Court determines that

it

was improper

for the District Court t0 convert the

Motion t0 a Motion for Summary Judgment, Saint Alphonsus requests the Court review the District
Court’s ruling on the Motion as one t0 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which would

still

merit

dismissal 0f Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

A
granted.

complaint must be dismissed for
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

12(b)(6), the

favor.”

v.

is

entitled to

the claims in the complaint.
v.

have

upon which

all

v.

set

Holliﬁeld, 96 Idaho 609, 61

1,

533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975);

looks to the pleadings to determine Whether a claim for relief has been stated.
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A motion to

of facts that would support

Idaho Power C0., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995).

at 104.

can be

inferences from the record Viewed in his

Where a plaintiff can prove no

Gardner

relief

order dismissing a case pursuant t0 I.R.C.P.

City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002).

dismiss, however, should be granted

Orthman

failure to state a claim

“When we review an

non-moving party

Young

its

A

12(b)(6) motion

Young, 137 Idaho

When

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts

entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily

to dismiss, in particular,

documents incorporated

which a court may take judicial notice.” Taylor
649 (2010) (emphasis added; quoting

“M

consider the complaint in

examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions
into the complaint

v.

by

refers t0 the

document;

motion

(2) the

Tellabs, Inc.

v.

Makor Issues

to dismiss, a court

document

is

m

& Rights,
is

and matters 0f

Ltd, 551 U.S. 308,

inconsistent With Idaho

consider evidence

if:

central t0 the plaintiff’s claim;

questions the authenticity 0f the document. See Daniels—Hall

998 (9th Cir.2010). Thus, because here the Complaint
central to Plaintiffs’ claim,

reference,

McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642,

322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007), and noting that nothing in Tellabs
authority). In considering a

its

cites

v.

and

and neither party has questioned

(1) the

and

complaint

(3)

n0 party

Nat'l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992,
refers t0 the

its

Agreement, Which

authenticity, this

Court

is

may

properly consider the Agreement in ruling 0n the Motion under Rule 12(b)(6).

Regardless of Which standard the Court applies, Saint Alphonsus
its

is

entitled to judgment in

favor 0n Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

ARGUMENT

V.
A.

Have Waived AnV Right t0 Claim That the Court Should Not Have
Converted the Dismissal Motion to a Motion for Summarv Judgment and Thev Have
Waived Anv Right t0 Claim Thev Should Have Been Provided Additional Time t0
Submit Evidence in Opposition t0 the Motion.
Plaintiffs

“This Court does not consider issues raised for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal.” Kirkman

134 Idaho 541, 544, 6 P.3d 397, 400 (2000).

v.

Stoker,

A party failed t0 preserve an issue for appeal if that

party did not raise the issue t0 the district court. Id. Here, the District Court concluded in the First

Order that

it

Without any

Motion

t0

would convert the Motion

t0 a

Motion

citation t0 the record, Plaintiffs

Dismiss

t0 a

Motion
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for

for

Summary Judgment.

(R. V01.

I,

p.

96-104.)

contend the District Court’s decision t0 convert the

Summary Judgment was over

objections 0f both parties. (See

Op.

Br. at 5.) In fact, the record

consideration 0f the
t0

Dismiss

t0 a

t0

Agreement 0r

Motion

Because

does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs obj ected t0 the District Court’s

for

that they objected t0 the District

Summary Judgment.

Plaintiffs did not obj ect t0 the District

Dismiss into a Motion for

Kirkman, 134 Idaho

at

Summary Judgment,

I,

p.

50-76; R. V01.

I,

p.

105-35.)

Court converting Saint Alphonsus’s Motion

they have not preserved the issue for appeal. See

544, 6 P.3d at 400. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot seek this Court’s review 0f

the District Court’s decision t0 treat the

In addition, Plaintiffs also
for the District Court t0 rule
in granting

(See R. V01.

Court converting the Motion

Motion

n0 evidentiary record on Which

motion for summary judgment.

waived any argument that the record did not have sufﬁcient

0n the Motion.

summary judgment to

as a

Plaintiffs

Saint Alphonsus

facts

argue 0n appeal that the District Court erred

on the unconscionability theory because “with

t0 base its ruling, [the District Court] issued a

Summary Judgment,

holding that Defendant’s billing practices were procedurally and substantively ‘conscionable’ ‘as
a matter 0f law.

3”

(Op. Br. at 2.) Plaintiffs argue the District Court “appears t0 have ignored the

burden 0f proof issue

entirely,

despite the fact that Defendant

seemingly placing the burden on Plaintiffs to prove their case,

had not even answered the complaint, much

less

responded to

appropriate discovery.” (Op. Br. at 7, fn. 5.)

While these arguments by

Plaintiffs

d0 not accurately summarize the District Court’s

decision and the basis for that decision, Plaintiffs chose not to seek additional time per Idaho Rule

0f Civil Procedure Rule 56(d) t0 submit additional

facts in response t0 the

Motion and,

instead,

chose t0 respond to the Motion and to not submit facts in support of their opposition for the Court
t0 consider before ruling

on the Motion. Had

Plaintiffs felt they

needed additional time

to

submit

evidence, Rule 56(d) provides they needed t0 submit an afﬁdavit 0r declaration identifying the

speciﬁc reasons they could not present such facts “essential t0 justify
the additional time

would allow them to do
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so.

[their]

opposition” and

how

As the masters 0ftheir own case strategy, Plaintiffs’

decision to respond to the Motion, to not present any additional facts for the District Court to

consider before deciding the Motion, and to not seek Rule 56(d) relief were judgment calls
Plaintiffs

made before

now

challenge

have been able

t0 present

the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case and they cannot

the District Court’s dismissal 0f their case

0n the grounds

additional facts in opposition t0 the Motion. See

that they should

Bank ofCommerce v.

Jejj’erson Enterprises,

LLC,

154 Idaho 824, 828, 303 P.3d 183, 187 (2013) (“T0 properly raise an issue 0n appeal there must
either

be an adverse ruling by the court below 0r the issue must have been raised in the court below,

an issue cannot be raised for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal.”).

Even if this Court Reviews the Issue of Whether the District Court Properlv Treated
the Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court Did Not Err

B.

“Where a motion

t0 dismiss for failure t0 state a

claim upon which relief can be granted

supported by information outside of the pleadings, the motion

judgment.” Syringa Networks, 367 P.3d

275 P.3d 824, 829 (2012)).

“If,

at

218

all

the material that

is

McCarm

for

summary

McCann, 152 Idaho

809, 814,

treated as a

v.

on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or

pleadings are presented to and not excluded

summary judgment under Rule

(citing

is

by

56. A11 parties

is

the court, the motion

motion

12(0), matters outside the

must be treated

must be given a reasonable opportunity

as

one for

t0 present

pertinent to the motion.” I.R.C.P. 12(d).

Here, the District Court interpreted Rule 12(d) and this Court’s decision in Syringa

Networks as requiring
District

on by

it

to treat the

Motion

as a

Motion

for

Summary Judgment because

the

Court was presented with something outside the pleadings — the actual Agreement relied

Plaintiffs

and cited

Agreement. (R. V01.

I,

p.
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in their

Complaint — and

it

concluded that

it

should consider the

101-02.) Through the District Court’s First Order and the parties’

stipulation for

more

time, Plaintiffs

were granted substantially more time

(a month-and-a-half)

than Rule 56 provides (14 days) for a non-moving party t0 prepare an answering brief and submit

any opposing evidence

in opposition to a

summary judgment motion. See

Following the District Court’s First Order and the grant 0f additional time,
offer

any evidence for the

As

District

Plaintiffs

chose not t0

Court t0 consider.

discussed above, Plaintiffs also

record or that they were in any

I.R.C.P. 56(b)(2).

way

made no

indication that they desired to supplement the

precluded from presenting any facts essential t0 their

opposition to the Motion. Plaintiffs could have, but did not, seek Rule 56(d) relief and have waived

such argument as a

result.

As

such, the District Court properly considered the record before

so

C.

was within

Motion

t0

Dismiss t0 a Motion for

Summary Judgment, and

its

decision t0 d0

that a Justiciable Controversv

Did Not Exist

the court’s discretion and should be upheld.

The District Court Correctlv Concluded
1.

and

The District Court did not err in converting

the applicable law and dismissed Plaintiff s Complaint.

Saint Alphonsus’s

it

Plaintiffs

Lack Standing

t0

Bring an Action for Declaratory Relief

In order to satisfy the standing requirement for declaratory relief, a plaintiff must “allege

or demonstrate an injury in fact

and a substantial likelihood that thejudicial reliefrequested will

prevent 0r redress the claimed injury,” Miles
757, 763 (1989) (emphasis added; citing

v.

Idaho Power C0., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d

Duke Power

59, 72 (1978)), as well as an actual “real
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v.

Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S.

and substantial controversy

through a decree 0f a conclusive character.” Harris

P.2d 968, 991 (1984) (emphasis added).

C0.

v.

admitting 0f speciﬁc relief

Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681

Plaintiffs failed t0 allege 0r

a.

show a

substantial likelihood the relief

requested will prevent 0r redress the claimed injury
In order to determine Whether the requested declaratory relief will prevent 0r redress the

claimed injury, Idaho courts 100k t0 “whether

it

will clarify

and

settle the legal relations at issue,

and whether such declaration Will afford a leave from uncertainty and controversy giving
the proceeding.” Miles

v.

American

Natl.

v.

Idaho Power C0,, 116 Idaho

at 643,

778 P.2d

at

rise to

765 (quoting Sweeney

Bank, 62 Idaho 544, 115 P.2d 109 (1941)).

In this case, the District Court correctly found that Plaintiffs failed to establish standing

because they had not alleged 0r put forth any evidence to show a likelihood that their claimed
injury will be redressed

by

a decision in their favor.

(R. V01.

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they are liable t0 Saint

I,

p.

164-165.)

This

is

because

Alphonsus, under the terms of the

Agreement, for n0 more than the “reasonable” value 0f the services provided, yet Plaintiffs advised
the District Court that they

were

requesting a determination 0f the reasonable value of the

n_ot

services provided 0r the

amount

Plaintiffs also submitted

no evidence

that the Plaintiffs believe they should

services provided. (See, e.g., R. V01.

As

Dismiss).)

declaration

(R. V01.

I,

I,

p.

What they contend

105-35

(Pls.’

is

result in a billing rate at

any

billed.

(1d,)

the “reasonable” value 0f the

Suppl. Brieﬁng Opposing Def.’s Mot.

such, the District Court correctly reasoned that there

would

that “there has

as to

have been

rate other than the

is

To

“n0 assurance that such a

Chargemaster rate” and further

been n0 evidence presented that the Chargemaster rate

is

inherently unreasonable.”

p. 165.)

In addition, a declaration that Saint Alphonsus

may

only charge self—pay patients some

undetermined “reasonable value” 0f services would d0 nothing more than invite future
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litigation

t0 determine

in

its

what “reasonable value” means and whether Saint Alphonsus’s charges, as reﬂected

Chargemaster, are the “reasonable value” for the hospital’s services under individual patient

circumstances.

(“At the very

See State
least,

opinion based on a set

numerous

patients

In their

Philip Morris, Ina, 158 Idaho 874, 882, 354 P.3d 187, 195 (2015)

however, standing can never be assumed based 0n a merely hypothetical

The declaratory

injury”).

to

v.

relief Plaintiffs sought

would amount

t0

n0 more than an advisory

ofunknown and hypothetical facts—including emergency services provided

who

Opening

are not part 0f this lawsuit.

Brief, Plaintiffs assert, Without citation t0

any authority,

that they should

not be required to seek a determination 0f reasonable value because that would result in a

judgment against them. (Op.

Br. at 2-3, 25-26.)

money

However, by avoiding a determination of the

reasonable value 0f the services provided, Plaintiffs also avoid the purpose and function of a
declaratory relief claim: “t0 declare the rights, status and legal relations 0f persons affected

contracts.”

ABC Agra, LLC v.

by

Critical Access Grp., Ina, 156 Idaho 781, 783, 331 P.3d 523, 525

(2014) (citing Idaho Code §§ 10-1201, 10-1202.) Plaintiffs seek an interim and admittedly nonconclusive declaration concerning the Agreement based on a theory that

owing some undeﬁned “reasonable” amount
provided to them. (R. V01.

I,

p. 17,

ﬂ 42.)

t0 Saint

Plaintiffs

is

premised upon them

Alphonsus for the emergency medical care

make

the District Court’s point

when

they

admit that proving the “reasonable value” 0f the services provided would not only be “costly and

complex,” but indeed “unfeasible.” (Op. Br.

at 25.)

The declaration

Plaintiffs seek

would not

provide Plaintiffs 0r Saint Alphonsus with conclusive guidance regarding their respective “rights,
status

and

legal relations”
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the Court should

afﬁrm the ﬁnding 0f the

District

Court that Plaintiffs lack standing because they

have not demonstrated a likelihood that the declaration sought would remedy their alleged
Plaintiffs did not establish that

b.

an actual controversy

exists

injury.

between the

parties
Similarly, the District Court correctly concluded that “the

requirements of a justiciable controversy as

0f conclusive character.” (R. V01.

I,

p.

it

does not

call for

“An

Code

fails t0

meet the

speciﬁc resolution through decree

167 (emphasis added).) Speciﬁcally, the declaration sought

“would not terminate the uncertainty 0r controversy giving
167, citing Idaho

Complaint

rise t0 the proceeding.”

(R. V01.

important limitation upon [declaratory judgment] jurisdiction
in a case

is that,

a declaratory

Where an actual or justiciable controversy

exists.

concept precludes courts from deciding cases which are purely hypothetical 0r advisory.”
State,

omitted).

Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011)

T0 warrant

controversy that

is

the requested declaratory relief, there

must be a

real

controversy

is

is

may

facts.

not one premised on a hypothetical:

thus distinguished from a difference 0r dispute of a

hypothetical 0r abstract character; from one that

is

academic 0r moot... The

controversy must be deﬁnite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties

having adverse legal

interests.

..

It

must be a

real

and substantial controversy

admitting 0f speciﬁc relief through a decree 0f a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising What the law
state

Harris

v.

would be upon a hypothetical

of facts.

Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 968, 991 (1984).
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Wylie

and substantial

used to seek conclusive relief in a hypothetical future case dependent on unknown
705. Moreover, a justiciable controversy

This

(internal quotations

justiciable through a conclusive decree, not an advisory opinion that

A justiciable

p.

§ 10-1206.)

judgment can only be rendered

v.

I,

be

Id. at

Plaintiffs attempt t0 create the illusion

of a controversy with conclusory allegations that

“[a]n actual controversy clearly exists between Plaintiffs and Hospital, relating t0 their respective

legal rights

and duties,” because

“Plaintiffs

contend that they are only liable to pay the reasonable

value of the treatment received, Whereas Hospital claims

Chargemaster rates and has billed

Plaintiffs at

entitled to receive

it is

such rates.” (R. Vol.

I,

p. 13-14,

payment 0f its

1]

full

27.) That is not

sufﬁcient.

It is

evident from the Complaint that n0 actual controversy exists between Plaintiffs and

Saint Alphonsus.

And Plaintiffs’

failure t0

an opportunity by the District Court to d0

submit any evidence 0n
so,

conﬁrms

it.

Idaho 874, 882, 354 P.3d 187, 195 (2015) (“when standing
sufﬁcient, and the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction

allegation”). Plaintiffs

17,

1]

42.)

this point, after

See State
is

v.

Philip Morris, Ina, 158

challenged, mere allegations are not

must demonstrate

facts supporting this

concede they are obligated to pay for the care they received. (R. V01.

charges incurred” and that “the hospital’s ‘gross charges’” are contained in

at 7;

R. V01.

Saint Alphonsus less than

representation.

“all

I,

its

p. 10.)

Plaintiffs

its

p.

all

Chargemaster.

d0 not and cannot allege that they agreed

t0

pay

charges nor d0 they allege that the Agreement contains any such

Instead, Plaintiffs claim that despite agreeing to take ﬁnancial responsibility for

charges incurred” for the services received, Plaintiffs should be free t0 pay some undeﬁned

amount they believe t0 be
I,

I,

concede they agreed t0 be “ﬁnancially responsible for payment of

Plaintiffs also

(Opening Br.

being afforded

p. 13-14,

1]

27.)

the “reasonable value” 0f the treatments and services provided. (R. V01.

Yet, as discussed above, even the declaration sought

would not provide any

guidance t0 the parties regarding What amount Plaintiffs would be required t0 pay Saint Alphonsus.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF -

20

This

is

not a justiciable controversy because

it

will not result in a

judgment 0f a conclusive

character.

Further, Plaintiffs failed to

must ultimately pay

full

show an

Chargemaster

actual controversy because not all self—pay patients

rates.

Not-for-proﬁt hospitals like Saint Alphonsus are

required by federal law t0 establish written ﬁnancial assistance policies that apply t0

and medically necessary
23,

care.

I.R.C. § 501(r)(4)(A).

(The Affordable Care Act, enacted March

2010, amended the federal tax code t0 include these requirements.)

implementing hospital charity care
Chargemaster

rates,

rules, the

emergency

all

IRS conﬁrmed

that all patients

In regulations

may

be charged

but certain impoverished individuals cannot ultimately be expected to pay

those rates. 79 Fed. Reg. 78954-56, 78982-3, 78998 (Dec. 31, 2014).
allegations, a federal court in the Eastern District

When

considering similar

0f Michigan reasoned similarly t0 the District

Court here, criticizing putative class representatives for failing

t0 “allege that they inquired

0r attempted to qualify for [the hospital’s] charity-care discount.” Burton

v.

William

about

Beaumont

Hosp, 373 F.Supp.2d 707, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
Plaintiffs

have neither alleged nor shown that Saint Alphonsus failed to comply with or

meet these very speciﬁc requirements. Nor have

Plaintiffs

applied for ﬁnancial assistance and failed to qualify.
Plaintiffs did not allege 0r

The

even alleged that they requested or
District

Court correctly found that

prove that they were unable t0 secure ﬁnancial assistance or a discount

from Saint Alphonsus. (R. V01.

I,

p.

165-166.)

By not making any allegation

as t0

Whether they

qualiﬁed for Saint Alphonsus’ federally mandated charity care program, Plaintiffs have failed t0
establish there

is

an actual controversy between the
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parties.

For those reasons,

this

Court should

afﬁrm the

District Court’s

between the
D.

The

ﬁnding

that

Parties’

alleged 0r proven t0 exist

Agreement Does Not Contain An Open Price Term

The

District Court Correctly Concluded “All Charges Incurred”
open price term.

As explained

if this

Agreement does not contain an open
an open price term, (R. V01.

I,

price term.

p. 17,

I,

p.

173-174.)

is

favor on the contract interpretation issue because the

its

Despite Plaintiffs’ argument that the Agreement

1N 40-43), the District Court held that the term

“unambiguous and sufﬁciently deﬁnite

the price term.” (R. Vol.

Saint Alphonsus

Court determines they have standing,

nonetheless entitled t0 judgment in

is

not an

is

above, Plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue their claim against Saint

Alphonsus; however, even

incurred”

is

parties.

1.

left

n0 actual present controversy

The

t0 refer t0 the defendant’s

District

is

charges

Chargemaster

list

for

Court further concluded that Plaintiffs raised

“n0 genuine issue 0f material fact” that would require a different
forth herein, the District Court’s reasoning

“all

result.

(Id.)

For the reasons

set

correct and this Court should afﬁrm.

Several courts have previously addressed similar arguments and routinely held that an

agreement

t0

pay

“all

charges”

is

neither uncertain nor ambiguous.

addressed a similar argument in DiCarlo

v. St.

For example, the Third Circuit

Mary Hosp, 530 F.3d 255

(3d Cir. 2008). There, the

agreement, like the one at issue here, stated that the patient would pay “all charges,” which the
plaintiff

claimed was too vague. The Third Circuit disagreed, explaining that such reference

ambiguous because such reference can only
the only
it is

way the hospital

refer to the

Chargemaster

rates, that

not

such reference

is

can communicate the patient’s ﬁnancial obligations t0 the patient, and that

not for the courts to determine what reasonable rates are:

This case, and other similar cases being brought throughout the country, arise out
0f the anomalies which exist in the American system 0f providing health care
court could not possibly determine what a “reasonable charge” for hospital
.

A

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF -

is

22

.

.

services would be Without wading into the entire structure of providing hospital
care and the means of dealing With hospital solvency. These are subjects With

Which

state and federal executives, legislatures, and regulatory agencies are
wrestling and which are governed by numerous legislative acts and regulatory
bodies. For a court t0 presume t0 address these problems would be rushing in where
angels fear to tread. What Plaintiff is asking the Court t0 d0 here is, put simply,
to solve the problems 0f the American health care system, problems that the
political branches 0f both the federal and state governments and the efforts 0f
the private sector have, thus far, been unable t0 resolve. Like other similar suits
ﬁled in other federal courts, this action seeks judicial intervention in a political
morass.

Id. at

263-64 (emphasis added; some alterations t0

More
Limberg

v.

recently, the

original; footnotes omitted).

Supreme Court of North Dakota addressed a

insurance and

was asked

and did

t0 sign,

and Release Information’ form.

.”
.

at

Sanford Medical Center Fargo.

sign, Sanford’s ‘Statement

He

did not have

0f Financial Responsibility

Similar t0 the Agreement at issue here, the plaintiff in Limberg

agreed that he would be “ﬁnancially responsible for

all

charges related t0 services provided by

Raising the same arguments that Plaintiff advances here, Limberg argued that “the

Id.

contract at issue

is

ambiguous because

contract requires

all

patients t0

pay

‘for all

patients

661.

The North Dakota Supreme Court

may pay less

for services

contains an ‘open price’ term,” and speciﬁcally, “the

it

some

charges related t0 services provided by Sanford,’ though

under health care programs than self—pay patients.”
disagreed.

In

its

and relied 0n

their reasoning that “although the price

itself,

the contract included

the contract could be determined,
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words

making

that

0f each hospital service was not

ﬁxed an

Id. at

analysis, the court noted that “[c]0urts

throughout the country have addressed allegations identical 0r similar t0 those alleged in

contract

In

Sanford Medical Center Fargo, 881 N.W.2d 658, 659 (2016), the plaintiff “sought

emergency department care and treatment

Sanford.”

similar argument.

ascertainable fact

by Which

this

case”

listed in the

the terms of

the contract deﬁnite and certain.” Id. at 661.

Noting the

similarities

Supreme Court found

between the case before

it

and other similar cases, the North Dakota

that references t0 “rates” 0r “charges”

0f a hospital are unambiguous and

clearly refer to Chargemaster rates:

[A]1th0ugh the exact price 0f the services provided by Sanford was not listed in the
itself, the price terms were controlled by language Within the contract. The
language obligates patients t0 pay “all charges related to services provided by
Sanfor ,” according t0 Sanford’s payment guidelines. These set guidelines are
made available to all patients, as stated in the contract, and both parties agree
Limberg was charged according t0 the charges Sanford has established in its
Chargemaster list. Many courts across the nation have held that references t0
the “rates” 0r the “charges” 0f a hospital are unambiguous and sufﬁciently
deﬁnite to refer to a Chargemaster list for the price term. See DiCarlo v. St.
Mary Hosp, 530 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir.2008) (adopting the trial court's opinion,
holding “all charges and collection costs for services rendered” was not open, but
instead referred to the Chargemaster); Holland v. Trinity Health Care Corp, 287
Mich.App. 524, 791 N.W.2d 724, 726 (2010) (“usual and customary charges” for
medical care unambiguously referred t0 the prices stated in the Chargemaster);
Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., Ina, 179 N.C.App. 120, 633 S.E.2d 113, 123—
24 (2006) (the “regular rates” language within a contract unambiguously referred
contract

t0 the hospital's
Id. at

662 (concluding

Chargemaster

list).

that the language “all charges related t0 services provided

by Sanford”

reasonably deﬁnite and certain to refer t0 rates of services set out in Sanford's Chargemaster

The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
because

it

that that the patient’s complaint

failed to present a justiciable controversy

is

list).

must be dismissed

upon which the court could

rule:

Which
and these prices are the same for all individuals
[N]o
ambiguity exists regarding the price term 0f the Contract, because the base price is
the same for each individual pursuant t0 the Chargemasters
Thus, the Complaint
presenting a justiciable controversy upon which the
has failed t0 allege facts
Court can render a declaratory judgment either terminating the controversy or
removing an uncertainty.
[T]here

is

n0 dispute

that the Contract refers to Sanford's pricing guidelines,

are the Chargemasters,

.

.

.

Id. at

.

.

.

.

.

.

662 (emphasis added).

Based on an in-depth analysis 0f the authority and the alleged and undisputed
the court, the District Court found that both
issue in this case

and

that the reasoning
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DiCarlo and Limberg are “analogous

employed therein

is

persuasive.” (R. V01.

facts before

t0 the facts at

I,

p. 173.)

The

terms of the Agreement are not ambiguous or uncertain. Instead, the District Court found that the
terms “ﬁnancial polices” and

“all

charges” unambiguously can only refer t0 Saint Alphonsus’s

ﬁnancial policies and Chargemaster rates Which are available t0

Limberg,
that:

it is

Like the plaintiff in

undisputed that Plaintiffs also signed the acknowledgement which

“This form has been explained t0 me, and

and have had an opportunity
Court did not

all patients.

err in

t0

have

my

I

certify that

I

have read

questions answered.”

it,

(R. V01.

states, in part,

understand
I,

p. 47.)

its

contents,

The

District

concluding that Saint Alphonsus’s charges are not open price terms and can

be readily identiﬁable.

Each 0f Plaintiffs’ Arguments Attacking the District Court’s Interpretation 0f
the Agreement Fail as a Matter of Law

2.

Plaintiffs’

Plaintiffs

arguments regarding the issue 0f contract interpretation should be disregarded.

claim the District Court’s analysis

is

ﬂawed

for three reasons: the District Court did not

analyze the “plain” language 0f the Agreement, the District Court failed t0 consider the parties’

intent,

and the

6-13.)

Each argument

Court did not analyze the incorporation by reference doctrine. (Op. Br.

District

i.

fails.

The District Court Did Not Fail
Agreement

Plaintiffs’ issue

with the phrase

“all

Alphonsus, like other hospitals nationwide,
the term “Chargemaster”

to consider the plain

at

is

calls its list

25

of standard charges a Chargemaster, that

not included the Agreement and, therefore, that the District Court failed

It is

clear

the District Court considered the plain language 0f the
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Consider the Plain Language 0f the

charges incurred” appears t0 be with the fact that Saint

language of the Agreement.

contain an open price term.

t0

from the

Agreement

District Court’s decision that

in concluding that

it

does not

Speciﬁcally, and as discussed at length above, the District Court analyzed the language in

Agreement whereby

the

Plaintiffs undisputedly

conﬁrm that they “understand and agree

that

I

am

ﬁnancially responsible for payment of all charges incurred which are not paid by any Third-Party
Payors.

47.)

..

The

including, any and

District Court also considered the

policies relating t0

my payment

copy 0f such policies
District

is

Court then found

it

“is

obligations for medical care received.

n0

less clear

I,

p.

term that asks patients “agree t0 abide by the ﬁnancial

available in the registration area and

found was ‘deﬁnite and

The

products provided 0r services rendered t0 Patient.” (R. V01.

all

..

and acknowledge

upon request.”

(R. V01.

I,

that a

p. 47.)

The

and unambiguous than the language the Limberg court

certain, referring t0 Sanford’s

District Court further explained that “like

Chargemaster

rates.”’1

Limberg, the agreement

I,

p. 173.)

alerts patients that the

defendant’s ‘ﬁnancial policies’ are available t0 them upon request.” (R. V01.
District Court concluded, this is the only reasonable interpretation

(R. V01.

I,

p. 173.)

As

the

0f the plain language 0f the

Agreement.

The District Court Properly Concluded
Unambiguous

ii.

Idaho courts

may

ambiguous. Steel Farms,

that

the Agreement

consider parol evidence only if the plain language of the contract

Inc.

v.

Croft

& Reed, Ina,

“I agree that

I

am

Sanford.” Limberg, 881

is

controlling.”

ﬁnancially responsible for all charges related t0 services provided

N.W.2d

at

is

154 Idaho 259, 266, 297 P.3d 222, 229 (2012).

This rule makes sense because “[t]he plain language 0f a contract, ifunambiguous,

1

was

by

659 (emphasis added.)

2

Compare
.. acknowledge that a copy 0f such policies is available in the registration area
and upon request” with “I understand that these guidelines are available for my review, upon
request t0 Sanford.” Limberg, 881 N.W.2d at 659.
“I.
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Id. Plaintiffs’

argument that the court should consider extrinsic parol evidence

Plaintiffs’ other

argument

that the District

is

inconsistent with

Court failed t0 consider the plain language 0f the

Agreement.3 In any event, putting aside inconsistent positions, they are moot because
admit in their Opening Brief that the Agreement’s language
therefore appropriate for the District Court to rule
the court needed

no further evidence

is

not ambiguous and that

on the issue 0f contract

t0 interpret the

Plaintiffs

Agreement. (Op. Br.

it

was

interpretation because

at 16, “Plaintiffs

do not

dispute the possibility for the court below, furnished with a copy of the Contract, to interpret the

Contract”) Based 0n Plaintiffs’ position that the contract language

asked
that

this

was before

correct t0
is

Court t0 apply

ﬁnd

own

interpretation t0 the contract, based

that the language

0f the Agreement

inadmissible, despite the fact that Plaintiffs

review

is

unambiguous,

Plaintiffs

0n the exact same evidence

the District Court. Plaintiffs cannot reasonably dispute that the District Court

Moreover, even

v.

its

is

if the

is

was

unambiguous, and therefore parol evidence

would have preferred a

different result.

Court did ﬁnd that the contract was ambiguous, “[a]ppellate court

limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.” Obenchain

McAlvaz'n C0nst., Ina, 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006) (internal citations omitted);

Nelson

v.

Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007). Plaintiffs would have this Court

consider extrinsic “evidence” that

is

unsupported by any

source), notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs

citation to the record (or

had notice and ample opportunity

submit such evidence to the District Court which gave Plaintiffs a second shot

Motion once

it

was converted

to a

motion for summary judgment. (See

3 Plaintiffs’ arguments contradict each other.

e.g.

at

any other

to gather

and

opposing the

Op. Br.

at 6,

“few

if

On the one hand, they argue that the contract is
unambiguous, meaning parol evidence is inadmissible t0 prove intent. But 0n the other, they also
contend that the District Court failed t0 consider the intent 0f the parties and rely on unsupported
factual assertions in support 0f that argument. Because the contract is unambiguous, and because
there is n0 evidence in the record for this Court to even consider, the intent of the parties must be
derived from the plain language 0f the Agreement. Steel Farms, Ina, 154 Idaho at 266.
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any patients have ever heard 0f the [Chargemaster]”;

8, “third-party

payors, such as those Which

cover Medicare, Medicaid, and insured patients, pay for services on the basis 0f their
existing rate schedules, not Chargemaster rates”; 9,
rate schedules”;

insurers,

pay

who

maj ority 0f emergency care

based 0n a rate schedule that

have been contractually agreed upon.
the

Agreement

is

pre-

are subj ect t0 pre-existing

“emergency care patients covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and private

10,

constitute that vast

for services

“90% 0f all patients

own

.

.”.)

is

patients, clearly

have no intention

much high than the pre-existing rate

None 0f these

to

schedules that

allegations should be considered because

not ambiguous and because Plaintiffs failed t0 provide any evidentiary support

in the record for them.

The District Court Did Not Need t0 Find Incorporation by Reference In
Order t0 Hold That theAgreementDoes Not Contain an Open Price Term

iii.

Plaintiffs’ “incorporation

that

would

into the

by reference” argument

is

a red herring. Plaintiffs cite t0 n0 law

require the District Court to hold that the Chargemaster

Agreement

in order t0

charges, contained in

language 0f the phrase

its

hold that the term

Chargemaster.

“all charges,”

The

“all

District

was incorporated by reference

charges” means the hospital’s standard

Court needed only to interpret the plain

which, as set forth above,

it

There can be n0 meaning

did.

ascribed t0 “all charges” other than Saint Alphonsus’s standard charges, which Plaintiffs admit are

contained in

its

Chargemaster.4

In any event, to the extent this Court

support the District Court’s holding, which
into the

ﬁnds

it is

that incorporation

not, the

Chargemaster

by referenced
is

incorporated

is

needed

t0

by reference

Agreement under Idaho law. “A signed agreement may incorporate by reference t0 another

4 Plaintiffs

misunderstand the meaning the incorporation by reference doctrine, which is generally
used afﬁrmatively t0 assert that another document is incorporated by reference, not t0 attempt
prove a negative.
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agreement, Which

is

not signed by the parties, if the terms to be incorporated are adequately

identiﬁed and readily available for inspection by the parties.” Harris, Inc.

v.

Foxhollow Const.

Trucking, Ina, 151 Idaho 761, 777, 264 P.3d 400, 416 (2011) (citing Wattenbarger

Edwards

&

Sons, Ina, 150 Idaho 308, 320, 246 P.3d 961, 973 (2010)).5

Agreement,
obligations,”

which

request.” (R. V01.
(R. V01.

I,

I,

acknowledged were “available

Plaintiffs

p. 47.)

These are undisputed

facts cited

my

payment

in the registration area

and upon

and relied upon by the

Agreement does not contain an “open” price term and
which are found

Plaintiffs its standard charges,

The Agreement
Even

entitled to

District Court.

p. 173.)

Regardless 0f Whether the Court holds that incorporation by reference

E.

AG.

Here, by signing the

agreed t0 “abide by the ﬁnancial policies relating t0

Plaintiffs

v.

&

judgment

in

its

necessary, the

Alphonsus

t0 bill

in the hospital’s Chargemaster.

Not Unconscionable

Is

if Plaintiffs

in fact permits Saint

is

had established standing—which they have not—Saint Alphonsus

is

favor 0n the issue of unconscionability because Plaintiffs have failed to

establish essential elements of their claim, and, as a matter of law, the

Agreement

is

neither

procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.

“For a contract 0r contractual provision
procedurally

ﬂl

t0

substantively unconscionable.

be voided as unconscionable,

it

must be

bo_th

Procedural unconscionability relates to the

bargaining process leading t0 the agreement while substantive unconscionability focuses upon the

terms 0f the agreement

itself.”

Lovey

v.

Regence BlueShield ofldaho, 139 Idaho 37, 42, 72 P.3d

877, 882 (2003) (internal citation omitted; emphasis added). “Procedural unconscionability

5

The Court should disregard

Plaintiffs’ citation t0 out-of-state

law on incorporation by reference

as well as dissenting opinions to the extent those cases can be read to

standard for incorporation
Br. at 11-13.)
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by reference than Idaho law

may

demand a more

requires, as set forth in Harris.

exacting
(See Op.

arise

When

the contract ‘was not the result 0f free bargaining

Northwest Pipeline Corp.

between the parties.”

Id. (citing

Forrest Weaver Farm, Ina, 103 Idaho 180, 183, 646 P.2d 422, 425

v.

“Substantive unconscionability focuses solely upon the terms 0f the contract or provision

(1 982)).

at issue.” Id. (citing

Hershey

v.

Simpson, 111 Idaho 491, 725 P.2d 196

(Ct.

App. 1986) (emphasis

Here, the District Court did not err in deciding that Saint Alphonsus was entitled t0

added).

judgment

as a matter 0f law

that the

Agreement was unconscionable.

Failed t0 Demonstrate an Issue 0f Fact for Trial on

Plaintiffs

1.

0n claim

Their

Unconscionability Theory
After deciding t0 treat Saint Alphonsus’s Motion as a Motion for

Summary Judgment,

the

Court granted Plaintiffs time t0 submit “a supplemental response and any materials

District

relevant t0 this court’s consideration 0f this motion as a motion for
t0 I.R.C.P. 56.” (R. V01.
First Order, Plaintiffs

I,

p. 103.) In their

that the

supplemental brieﬁng following the District Court’s

argued that summary judgment for Saint Alphonsus was improper on

Plaintiffs’ unconscionability

showing

summary judgement pursuant

theory because Saint Alphonsus had not put evidence in the record

Agreements were

fair, i.e.,

not unconscionable. (R. V01.

I,

p. 110-12.) Plaintiffs

contended that evidence existed supporting their unconscionability theory, but they did not submit

any evidence

in opposition to the

(See, e.g. , R. V01.

I,

p.

was inappropriate because
billing

relied

0n mere

allegations in the Complaint.

125 (arguing that the unconscionability theory is supported by a high charge-

to-cost ratio Without referring t0

its

Motion and instead

any evidence).)

Saint Alphonsus

and collection practices.” (R. V01.

Plaintiffs again

argued that summary judgment

had not offered evidence “as
I,

p. 125.) Plaintiffs

t0 the conscionability

0f

never offered evidence supporting

the unconscionability theory.

Plaintiffs

puts

upon

the

appear to misunderstand that this Court has adopted the Celotex standard which

nonmovant the burden
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to

show a

dispute as to a material issue of fact Where the

nonmovant has

the burden 0f proof at

nonmoving party

fails t0

make

essential t0 that party's case

Alphonsus Reg'l Med.

Ctr.

v.

trial:

“The moving party

is

entitled t0

judgment when the

a showing sufﬁcient t0 establish the existence 0f an element

0n which

that party will bear the

burden 0f proof

at trial.” Saint

Raney, 163 Idaho 342, 344, 413 P.3d 742, 744 (2018) (citing a prior

Idaho Supreme Court opinion Which relied 0n Celotex

v.

Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 106

S.Ct. 2548,

91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1 986)). Plaintiffs did not submit any evidence of unconscionability which would

demonstrate an issue 0f material fact for trial on elements 0f a claim for Which they bore the burden

of proof. Accordingly, the District Court’s dismissal was appropriate.
2.

The Agreement

Is

Not Procedurally Unconscionable

Despite being provided an opportunity t0 d0 so, Plaintiffs failed t0 establish any
disputed 0r not, that would support a ﬁnding 0f procedural unconscionability.

That

is

facts,

because

there are none.

two areas: lack 0f
Lack ofvoluntariness can be shown by factors

Indicators 0f procedural unconscionability generally fall into

voluntariness and lack ofknowledge.

such as the use of high-pressure

tactics, coercion,

oppression or threats short of

0n the parties' bargaining power with the stronger
party’s terms being nonnegotiable and the weaker party being prevented by market
factors, timing, or other pressures from being able t0 contract with another party 0n
more favorable terms or t0 refrain from contracting at a11[.]
duress.

..

0r

Lovey, 139 Idaho

by

great imbalance

at 42,

72 P.3d

at

882

(citations omitted).

“Lack 0f knowledge can be shown by

lack of understanding regarding the contract terms arising from the use 0f inconspicuous print,

ambiguous wording, 0r complex
and inquire about

its

legalistic 1anguage[;] the lack

0f opportunity t0 study the contract

terms[;] 0r disparity in the sophistication, knowledge, or experience 0f the

parties[.]” Id. (citations omitted).

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 31

Defendant’s Contract

Plaintiffs allege that “[e]ven if

agreement for patients t0 pay for services

at

ultimately interpreted as an

is

Defendant’s Chargemaster rates, such provision would

nonetheless be oppressive, and, given the circumstances under which emergency care patients sign
their Contracts,

would be both substantively and procedurally unconscionable and accordingly

void and unenforceable.” (R. V01.

I,

“circumstances”

any factual 0r evidentiary support for

are

0r

provide

p. 13,

11

Plaintiffs,

26.)

however,

fail to

allege

What these

their

procedural

unconscionability allegations. Plaintiffs also do not allege that they lacked knowledge regarding
Saint Alphonsus’s charges.

expectations that “they

would not be

treatment/services” (R. V01.

fact,

They only vaguely

I,

p. 13,

1]

allege that the charges

billed

24),

more than

for

Which

is

the

were not

in line with their

reasonable value 0f the

a nebulous indeterminate amount.

And

in

pursuant t0 the undisputed terms 0f the Agreement, Plaintiffs acknowledged that they

understood the contents of the Agreement and had an opportunity to have

all

of their questions

answered, refuting any unsupported procedural unconscionability allegations. (R. V01.
Further, as noted

by the

District Court, Plaintiffs

I,

p. 47.)

do not allege Saint Alphonsus would have

refused t0 provide emergency services to Plaintiffs if they refused t0 sign the Agreement. Notably,
hospitals cannot

deny emergency services

t0 patients

Who present at their Emergency Department,

regardless 0f whether those patients signed the hospital’s conditions 0f admission agreement. See

42 U.S.C.

§

1395dd; 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (the Emergency Medical Treatment

related regulations require hospitals t0 provide services t0 all patients

emergency conditions). Hospitals

are also prohibited

Labor Act and

Who present at hospitals With

from delaying examination or treatment

order t0 inquire about an individual’s method 0f payment 0r insurance status.
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&

See 42 C.F.R.

in

§

489.24.

Plaintiffs

do not allege that Saint Alphonsus failed

t0

meet

obligations under these

its

statutes.

Nor does the fact that the Agreement is

a form contract

mean that it is automatically deemed

procedurally unconscionable without additional facts showing unconscionability. Acknowledging
that the

Agreement

is

a form contract offered to

all

hospital

emergency room patients, the

District

Court conﬁrmed that “an adhesion contract cannot be held procedurally unconscionable solely
because there was n0 bargaining over the terms.” (R. V01.
43.) Rather, “[a]dhesion contracts are a fact 0f modern life”

(Id.

,

citing Lovey, 139 Idaho at 43.)

The

District

I,

p. 175, citing

Lovey, 139 Idaho

at

and “are not against public policy.”

Court found that the undisputed material facts do

not demonstrate a lack 0f voluntariness due t0 the adhesive nature of the Agreement.

Plaintiffs

submitted n0 evidence 0f any duress, and Saint Alphonsus cited legal authority that requires the
hospital t0 treat patients presenting t0

method 0f payment 0r insurance

emergency departments prior

status.

(R. V01.

I,

t0 inquiring about a person’s

p. 177.) Plaintiffs

presented n0 allegations 0r

evidence that Saint Alphonsus failed to meet these obligations. (R. V01.

The

District

I,

p. 177.)

Court further found that the undisputed material facts d0 not demonstrate a

lack 0f knowledge 0f the terms 0f the Agreement: the “language within the Financial Policy

provision 0f the admission agreement

was unambiguous” and by signing the Agreement,

“certiﬁed that (1) the form had been explained t0 them; (2) they read
contents; (4) they

had an opportunity

to

have

their questions answered;

each 0f the provisions set forth in the agreement.” (R. V01.
Saint Alphonsus

met

its

I,

p. 177;

it;

(3) they

and

Plaintiffs

understood

(5) they

its

consented t0

see also R. V01.

I,

p. 49.)

burden on procedural unconscionability by submitting the undisputed
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Agreement.

Plaintiffs

unconscionability.

As

Plaintiffs failed to

show

failed

any evidence

a result, the District Court
that the

The Agreement

3.

present

t0

Agreement
Is

is

was

that

would support a ﬁnding 0f
and correct

entirely justiﬁed

procedurally unconscionable.

Not Substantively Unconscionable

Because both procedural and substantive unconscionability are required
contract term

is

failed t0 establish procedural unconscionability after Saint

139 Idaho

at 42,

facts, the hospital

to

prove that a

ﬁnd that Plaintiffs had

unconscionable, and the District Court had n0 option but to

undisputed material

in holding that

Alphonsus met

its

burden based upon

need not address substantive unconscionability. See Lovey,

72 P.3d at 882. Nonetheless, as

set forth herein, the District

Court was also correct

in determining that Plaintiffs failed t0 establish substantive unconscionability.

“[A] contract 0r provision
in his 0r her senses

fair

is

substantively unconscionable if it

is

a bargain that n0 person

and not under delusion would make 0n the one hand and

person would accept 0n the other.”

Id.

that

no honest and

“Substantive unconscionability asks Whether, at the

time the contract was executed, and in light of the general background and commercial needs of a
particular case, the clause

Walker

v.

is

so one-sided as t0 oppress 0r unfairly surprise one 0f the parties.”

American Cyanamid C0., 130 Idaho 824, 831, 948 P.2d. 1123, 1130 (1997). In order t0

establish substantive unconscionability, courts will consider “the purpose

at issue, the

needs of both parties and the commercial setting in which the agreement was executed,

and the reasonableness 0fthe terms
at

and effect 0f the terms

882-83.
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at the

time 0f contracting.” Lovey, 139 Idaho

at

42-43, 72 P.3d

In

this

unconscionability.

neither

Plaintiffs

case,

would not be

treatment/services received.” (R. Vol.

I,

p. 13,

1]

provided

evidence

0f

substantive

Alphonsus’s charges are not in line with their

Plaintiffs alleged that Saint

subjective expectations that they

nor

alleged

billed

“more than the reasonable value 0f the

24.) Plaintiffs’ alleged expectation, however,

inherently imprecise because Plaintiffs do not allege What they believe a reasonable charge

be and expressly do not want the court t0 consider
expectation 0f charges

is

it.

must be one

accept.” Lovey, 139 Idaho at 42, 72 P.3d at 882.

would

Furthermore, a bare allegation of a different

T0 be

not sufﬁcient to establish substantive unconscionability.

substantively unconscionable, the contract term

is

that

“n0 honest and

However, an honest and

fair

fair

person would

uninsured person

could not reasonably expect his exposure to a hospital bill t0 be the same as apatient whoprocured
In fact, Plaintiffs acknowledge that patients with insurance often beneﬁt

healthcare coverage.

from substantial contractual adjustments
16.)

This difference

is

t0 the rates Saint

Alphonsus charges. (R. V01.

I,

p. 11,

1}

the core driver for Widespread public discourse over the past decades

concerning ways t0 help the uninsured obtain healthcare coverage.

Based on the undisputed

facts before

it,

the District Court had

no choice but to ﬁnd that the

terms 0f the ﬁnancial policy in the Agreement are not substantively unconscionable. (R. V01.
178.)

The

District Court’s holding is supported

by

the undisputed material facts.

I,

p.

After being

provided with sufﬁcient time t0 seek discovery and introduce disputed facts to defeat the Motion,
Plaintiffs

chose not to d0

s0,

and instead rely on the undisputed record before the District Court,

including the parties’ Agreement.
appropriately held that

it is

Under

the circumstances present here, the District Court

reasonable to expect a self—patient t0 pay Saint Alphonsus’s charges,

particularly in light of Plaintiffs’ express agreement t0
District

Court also held

that,

even assuming

d0 so by signing the Agreement.

Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding

being a multiple 0f the hospital’s ofﬁcially reported overall costs as
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(1d,)

The

Chargemaster rates

true, as a

matter 0f law, that

is

insufﬁcient to establish substantive unconscionability here. (R. V01.

I,

p.

176-177.) Moreover,

the reported costs 0f hospitals are irrelevant to determining the reasonable value of services. See

Children

’s

Hospital Central California

Blue Cross 0fCalif0mia, 226 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1278,

v.

172 Ca1.Rptr.3d 861, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (evaluating factors to be considered in determining
the reasonable value of hospital

emergency services and conﬁrming

appropriate factor for consideration).

Thus, a comparison 0f emergency

an

that costs are not

room

billed charges t0

reported overall hospital costs and cost-to-charge ratios cannot be an accurate assessment of the

reasonable

costs

of providing services and thus bear n0 relation in a determination 0f

unconscionability.
It is

who

reasonable for a person

pays for insurance, 0r for someone

who

qualiﬁes for Medicare 0r other government programs, to pay less than a person

See Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med.
that

it is

Ctr.,

is

uninsured.

Ina, 279 Ga. App. 586, 589, 631 S.E.Zd 792, 795 (2006) (noting

legislature has already established a policy favoring price

whereby judges and juries would be

We d0 not answer this call.

Finally, the

I,

p. 10,

known, within

11

called

.

14.)

and

on

comparison by the

patient),

t0 set appropriate prices for hospitals to charge their

.”).

Complaint concedes

t0 set fees for hospital services,

(R. V01.

Who

inappropriate for plaintiffs t0 “seek judicial intervention in a commercial transaction (for

Which the

patients.

seeks out and

that charges are the standard

and commonly accepted way

that the hospital’s charges are contained in the Chargemaster.

“Defendant, like other hospitals, maintains an internal document which

the billing department, as a ‘Charge Description Master’ 0r ‘Chargemaster.’

consists of a schedule of codes, description of service items,

each item 0f treatment 0r service, and
as set forth above, Plaintiffs’

standard charges—is

deﬁned

This

and the hospital’s ‘gross charges’ for

as such in governmental regulations.” (1d,) Thus,

own allegations conﬁrm that the billing method at issue in this case—

common,
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is

is

is

the product 0f a

complex

legislative

scheme regarding

obligations and billing

methods of hospitals,

the hospital’s Chargemaster. See Cox,

is

part of standard in the industry, and

279 Ga. App.

at

590

(“plaintiffs

is

contained in

d0 not allege that they are

being charged anything other than What the hospital normally charges uninsured patients, which
is

what the contract authorizes the hospital

Alphonsus

is

one link in a greater chain, and

entire legislative

it

The arrangement between

Plaintiffs

and Saint

cannot be substantively unconscionable

lest the

and healthcare system also be found unconscionable.

Saint Alphonsus

met

its

burden

substantively unconscionable based

Plaintiffs’ allegations

that the

t0 d0”).

District

0n

in establishing the terms

0f the Agreement are not

on the plain terms 0f the Agreement.

this point as true, as

Even accepting

a matter 0f law, the undisputed facts demonstrate

Court was justiﬁed in holding that the Agreement

is

not substantively

unconscionable. The Court should therefore afﬁrm the District Court’s judgment.
F.

Seek t0 Have the Court Address Issues That Are Alreadv
Comprehensivelv Addressed bv State and Federal Law

Plaintiffs Effectivelv

Even ifPlaintiffs had a legal basis

for their Complaint,

Which as the District Court correctly

recognized they do not, state and federal law already comprehensively speak to the issues that
Plaintiffs ask the

upon which

the entirety of hospital economics rests. For example, While federal law requires

hospitals t0 treat

discuss

Court to address here, and those laws reﬂect a series of important policy balances

any patient Who enters

payment (EMTALA, 42 U.S.C.

patients using a standard

standard

as Saint

list

list

their

§ 1395dd), the

0f charges (26 C.F.R.

of charges annually (42 U.S.C

Alphonsus

emergency rooms without delaying treatment
law also recognizes

all

t0

that hospitals charge

§ 1.501(r)-1), requires hospitals to publish their

§ 300gg-18(e)),

and requires non-proﬁt hospitals such

t0 provide signiﬁcant charity care discounts t0 patients earning less than a set
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percentage 0f the federal poverty level (79 Fed. Reg. 78954-56, 78982-3, 78998).

Further

recognizing the burden 0n hospitals t0 provide care t0 indigent patients and the difﬁculty in
securing reimbursement for services rendered, Idaho enacted the Medical Indigency Act of 1974.

See Idaho Code
84, 86,

§

31-3501, et seq.; Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr.

356 P.3d 377, 379 (2015) (“[T]he

indigency assistance statutes

is

v.

Gooding

Cty.,

legislature’s general intent in enacting the

Ada

Cnly. Bd.

ofComm ’rs,

medical

two-fold: to provide indigents With medical care and to allow

hospitals t0 obtain compensation for services rendered t0 indigents.”)(quoting Univ.

v.

159 Idaho

0f Utah Hosp.

143 Idaho 808, 810, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007)). Together, these

laws establish a carefully balanced framework that seeks t0 protect both patients and hospitals in
the context 0f emergency care.

“The wisdom,
alone.” Verska

v.

justice, policy, 0r

expediency 0f a statute are questions for the legislature

Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med.

(2011)(qu0ting Berry

v.

Cm,

151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508

Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1961)).

This Court

should not disturb the District Court’s decision t0 not wade into these waters already occupied by
existing laws.

VI.

It is

this case

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Saint Alphonsus’s position that

it

would be

legally justiﬁed t0 seek attorneys’ fees in

given that Saint Alphonsus believes Plaintiffs are pursuing this appeal frivolously,

unreasonably, and/or without foundation (Merrill
(2004); Idaho

Code

§

v.

Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 846, 87 P.3d 949, 955

12-121; I.A.R. 40, I.A.R. 41); however, Saint Alphonsus

on appeal.
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is

not claiming fees

VII.

For

all

CONCLUSION

the reasons stated herein, Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests this Court

the decision 0f the District Court to enter

Judgment

in Saint

afﬁrm

Alphonsus’s favor and against

Plaintiffs.

DATED this

19th

day 0f September, 2019.

DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC

By

/s/KeelV E.

Duke

Keely E. Duke — Of the Firm
Aubrey D. Lyon — Of the Firm
Attorneysfor Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center—Nampa, Inc.
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true copy of the foregoing document by ﬁling the same through the iCourt system, which sent an
automatic copy to registered participants by email.
I

Douglas

W.
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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Sonna Building
910 W. Main Street, Suite 222
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Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 336-2088
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Telephone: (208) 343-1211
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

LAW OFFICES OF BARRY L. KRAMER

Hand Delivered

9550 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 253
Las Vegas, NV 89123
Telephone: (702) 778-6090

EDDDD

Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Email/iCourt

kramerlaw@aol.com

Duke
Keely E. Duke
Aubrey D. Lyon

/s/Keelv E.
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